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Non-Technical Summary
A key issue in the theoretical and empirical literature of public finance is how intergov-
ernmental grants influence the level of local public spending of the recipient government.
Researchers have been particularly interested in whether grants from the federal government
stimulate higher levels of overall spending by local governments or rather substitute for local
tax revenue. The first effect is called the ‘flypaper effect’ following Arthur Okun’s observa-
tion that ‘money sticks where it hits’. In contrast, an aspect which has attracted far less
attention in the flypaper literature is concerned with the question whether observed changes
in expenditures are associated with analogous changes in the actual level of public goods or
services or whether increases in expenditures lead (at least to some extent) to a waste of
resources (or X-inefficiency) and losses in productive efficiency.
Given this background the aim of this paper is to add to the existing literature by studying
the causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local technical efficiency in Germany. For
this purpose we use a simple bureaucracy model and introduce the possibility that the fed-
eral government is able to give (lump sum) grants to the local government as a substitute
for local tax revenues. Moreover, we assume that the citizens of the local jurisdiction are
susceptible to a misperception of the true tax price of the local public goods or services due
to fiscal illusion. In fact, it is assumed that a higher amount of intergovernmental grants
leads to an underestimation of the true tax price by the citizens and therefore to a higher
demand of public output. Using this framework we analyse how a higher degree of redis-
tribution, that is an increase in the amount of grants to the local government, affects the
technical efficiency in the provision of public goods and services in this local jurisdiction. We
find that a higher degree of redistribution has a negative impact on the technical efficiency
in the local jurisdiction.
Finally, the results derived in the theoretical analysis are tested in an empirical framework
using a broad panel of German municipalities. Germany is an interesting case to study
since grants received from higher levels of governments make up a considerable share of
local governments revenue. To figure out the impact of intergovernmental aid on technical
efficiency we apply stochastic frontier estimation techniques. The results of the empirical
analysis are consistent with our theoretical findings and support the existence of a negative
incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on local authorities’ cost efficiency. We find
that an increase in the amount of grants received by the local government indeed leads to a
reduction in technical efficiency or to an increase in X-inefficiency in that local jurisdiction.
Zusammenfassung
Eine Schlu¨sselfrage sowohl in der theoretischen als auch in der empirischen finanzwissen-
schaftlichen Literatur besteht darin, wie (vertikale und horizontale) Finanzzuweisungen das
Ausgabenniveau derjenigen Gebietsko¨rperschaft, welche die Zuweisungen empfa¨ngt, beein-
flussen. Dabei wurde in der Vergangenheit insbesondere untersucht, ob Finanzzuweisungen
an lokale Gebietsko¨rperschaften (z.B. Kommunen) zu einer Erho¨hung des Ausgabenniveaus
fu¨hren, oder ob sie einfach als Substitut fu¨r (fehlende) Steuereinnahmen dienen. Sollte Ers-
teres der Fall sein, spricht man von einem so genannten ”flypaper effect”; danach wird das
Geld (die Zuweisungen) auch dort ausgegeben, wo es hinfließt und wird nicht etwa in Form
von Steuererma¨ßigungen wieder an die Bu¨rger zuru¨ckgegeben (”money sticks where it hits”).
Demgegenu¨ber wurde in der Literatur weit weniger untersucht, inwieweit diese zusa¨tzlichen
Ausgaben auch das Niveau der o¨ffentlichen Gu¨ter bzw. Dienstleistungen erho¨hen, oder ob
sie - zumindest teilweise - nicht vielmehr die Verschwendung von o¨ffentlichen Ressourcen
(”X-Ineffizienzen”) beispielsweise durch die jeweiligen Amtsinhaber begu¨nstigen.
Dieser Beitrag stellt einen Versuch dar, diese Lu¨cke zu schließen. Hierfu¨r wird ein ein-
faches Bu¨rokratiemodell herangezogen, bei dem die Bundesregierung die Mo¨glichkeit besitzt,
(pauschale) Finanzzuweisungen - als Substitut fu¨r (fehlende) eigene Steuereinnahmen - an
die lokalen Gebietsko¨rperschaften zu gewa¨hren. Daru¨ber hinaus besteht die Mo¨glichkeit,
dass die Einwohner der lokalen Gebietsko¨rperschaften einer ”Fiskalillusion” unterliegen, was
bedeutet, dass sie die tatsa¨chliche Ho¨he des Steuerpreises fu¨r die o¨ffentlichen Gu¨ter bzw.
Dienstleistungen falsch wahrnehmen ko¨nnen. Konkret wird hierbei unterstellt, dass eine
Erho¨hung der Finanzzuweisungen an eine lokale Gebietsko¨rperschaft die dort ansa¨ssigen
Bu¨rger dazu veranlasst, die Ho¨he des tatsa¨chlichen Steuerpreises zu unterscha¨tzen und somit
ein ho¨heres Niveau an o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern bzw. Dienstleistungen nachzufragen. Mit diesem
Modellansatz wird dann anschließend untersucht, wie eine Erho¨hung der Zuweisungen durch
die Bundesregierung die technische Effizienz der lokalen Gebietsko¨rperschaft bei der Bereit-
stellung von o¨ffentlichen Gu¨tern beeinflusst. Die theoretische Analyse zeigt, dass die Fi-
nanzzuweisungen einen negativen Einfluss auf die (technische) Effizienz der lokalen Gebiets-
ko¨rperschaft ausu¨ben.
Mithilfe eines umfangreichen Panels von deutschen (baden-wu¨rttembergischen) Gemeinden
werden die Ergebnisse des theoretischen Teils anschließend empirisch getestet. Deutschland
eignet sich hierfu¨r besonders gut, da ein erheblicher Teil der Gesamteinnahmen der Kom-
munen sowohl aus vertikalen als auch aus horizontalen Finanzzuweisungen resultiert. Um
den Einfluss der Zuweisungen auf die (Kosten-)Effizienz der Gemeinden empirisch zu testen,
kommen o¨konometrische Scha¨tzverfahren zur Anwendung, die speziell fu¨r solche Fragestel-
lungen entwickelt wurden (”stochastic frontier analysis”). Die Ergebnisse der empirischen
Analyse unterstu¨tzen die Hypothese des theoretischen Teils: Eine Erho¨hung der Finanz-
zuweisungen fu¨hrt tatsa¨chlich zu einem Ru¨ckgang des Effizienzniveaus der Gemeinden. Die
Ergebnisse deuten somit darauf hin, dass die Finanzzuweisungen einen negativen Anreizef-
fekt auf die (Kosten-)Effizienz der Gemeinden ausu¨ben.
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1 Introduction
A key issue in the theoretical and empirical literature of public finance is how intergov-
ernmental grants influence the level of local public spending of the recipient government.
Researchers have been particularly interested in whether grants from the federal government
stimulate higher levels of overall spending by local governments, or rather substitute for local
tax revenue. The first effect is called the ‘flypaper effect’ (Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld,
1979) following Arthur Okun’s observation that ‘money sticks where it hits’. This is because
grants entering the public sector also stay there, rather than being distributed to the private
sector in the form of lower tax payments. There is a large empirical literature trying to
estimate the extent to which intergovernmental grants to state and local governments are
associated with higher government spending (for a review see e.g. Hines and Thaler, 1995).
Some of these studies attempt to explain the flypaper effect by specification errors in the
econometric estimation (for a recent study see e.g. Knight, 2002), other studies suggest that
the individuals underly a kind of fiscal illusion which leads to a misperception of the ‘true’
tax price (Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld, 1979; Oates, 1979).
An aspect which has attracted far less attention in the flypaper literature is concerned with
the question whether observed changes in expenditures are associated with analogous changes
in the actual level of public goods or services or whether increases in expenditures lead (at
least to some extent) to a waste of resources (or X-inefficiency, Leibenstein, 1966) and losses
in productive efficiency. In fact, to the best of our knowledge, only one study has so far at-
tempted to assess the impact of intergovernmental aid on technical efficiency or X-efficiency
(Silkman and Young, 1982). This empirical study investigates the technical efficiency of two
public services (school bus transportation and public libraries) in the United States using
cross section data. Silkman and Young (1982) show that the non-local proportion of total
revenues (that is the proportion of intergovernmental grants) have a strong negative impact
on the productive efficiency of local government’s services. In a further study, De Borger and
Kerstens (1996) analyse the determinants of local governments’ cost efficiency in Belgium
using different parametric and non-parametric estimation techniques. They also come to the
conclusion that (intergovernmental) grants stimulate technical inefficiency. Finally, Kotso-
giannis and Schwager (2006) show in a recent theoretical analysis that fiscal equalisation
programs foster the incentives of the incumbents towards more rent extraction by reducing
the intensity of political competition.
Given this background the aim of this paper is to add to the existing literature by studying
the causal effects of intergovernmental grants on local technical efficiency in Germany. For
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this purpose we use a simple bureaucracy model of Niskanen (1975) and introduce the possi-
bility that the federal government is able to give (lump sum) grants to the local government
(as a substitute for local tax revenues). Moreover we assume, similar to Moesen and van
Cauwenberge (2000), that the citizens of the local jurisdiction are susceptible to a mispercep-
tion of the true tax price of the local public goods or services due to fiscal illusion. In fact, it
is assumed that a higher amount of intergovernmental grants leads to an underestimation of
the true tax price by the citizens and therefore to a higher demand of public output. Using
this framework we analyse how a higher degree of redistribution, that is an increase in the
amount of grants to the local government, affects the technical efficiency in the provision of
public goods and services in this local jurisdiction. We find that a higher degree of redistri-
bution has a negative impact on the technical efficiency in the local jurisdiction.
Finally, the results derived in the theoretical analysis are tested in an empirical framework
using a broad panel of German municipalities. Germany is an interesting case to study since
grants received from higher levels of governments make up a considerable share of local gov-
ernments revenue. To figure out the impact of intergovernmental aid on technical efficiency
we apply the stochastic frontier estimation approach proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995),
which allows us to make use of panel data. The results of the empirical analysis are consis-
tent with our theoretical findings and support the existence of a negative incentive effect of
intergovernmental grants on local authorities’ cost efficiency. We find that an increase in the
amount of grants received by the local government indeed leads to a reduction in technical
efficiency or to an increase in X-inefficiency in that local jurisdiction.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we conduct the theoretical
analysis where we also give a brief review of the original Niskanen (1971) bureaucracy model,
and derive a testable proposition. Section 3 describes the empirical analysis including an
introduction to the institutional setting of the German local governments. Final conclusions
are drawn in section 4.
2 Theoretical Analysis
2.1 The bureaucracy model of Niskanen
In the original bureaucracy model of Niskanen (1971) the relationship between a bureau and
its sponsor or funding agency is that of a bilateral monopoly. In our case we could assume,
for instance, that the sponsor is represented by the local government of a municipality which
approves a certain budget for a public bureau (e.g. the Road Construction Office) in order
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to “buy” services and goods from this bureau (e.g. the construction of new highways). We
further assume that the electoral process in the municipality is dominated by the median
voter and that the local government wants to meet the wishes of the median voter.
The total budget, TBN , which the sponsor is willing to approve, is assumed to be a quadratic
function of the public output, Q:
TBN = aQ− bQ2, (1)
that is, the total budget is a concave function of Q, reflecting diminishing marginal utility
of public output. Moreover, the minimum total production costs for producing the public
output, TC, are given by:
TC = cQ+ dQ2. (2)
As can be seen from equation (2), total costs are assumed to rise at an increasing rate like a
competitive firm’s cost schedule. This cost funtion is only known by the bureaucrat. Finally
the bureaucrat faces the constraint that the total budget must be equal or greater than the
minimum total costs:
TBN ≥ TC. (3)
Now, Niskanen (1971) assumes that the bureaucrat seeks to maximize the size of the budget,
TBN , that is the bureaucrat maximizes the budget-output function (1) over Q under the
constraint that (in)equality (3) is fulfilled. However, as pointed out by Migue´ and Be´langer
(1974), one implication of budget-maximization is that the production of public output is
allocatively inefficient (since the total budget is too large) but it is indeed technically efficient.
This, in turn, implies that there remains no surplus revenue for the bureaucrat which can
be devoted to his/her own ends since this would compete with the output. The bureaucrat,
however, has preferences for things like income, prestige, expansion of personnel, leisure
time, etc. Therefore, in a later version of his model, Niskanen (1975) extended the original
model by assuming that the bureaucrat has access to the “fiscal residuum” (Orzechowski,
1977; also called “discretionary profit”, Migue´ and Belanger, 1974 or “organizational slack”,
Cyert and March, 1963), which is defined as the difference between the total budget and the
minimum production costs,
FR = TBN − TC. (4)
The fiscal residuum measures the degree of production inefficiency or X-inefficiency (Leiben-
stein, 1966) at each possible production level.
Under the assumption that the bureaucrat has access to the fiscal residuum both the pro-
duction inefficiency and the output enter the utility function of the bureaucrat. That is, the
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bureaucrat (indirectly) is able to use parts of the budget for his/her own ends. One could
imagine for instance, that the fiscal residuum or X-inefficiency generates utility for the bu-
reaucrat in terms of leisure, long breaks, large expense accounts, political appointments and
so on. Therefore, if the choice variables of the bureaucrat are public output and technical
inefficiency, government production is allocatively as well as technically inefficient.
2.2 A bureaucracy model of fiscal illusion
Following Niskanen (1975) we assume that the utility function of the bureaucrat is given by:
U = α1Y
β1Nγ1 , (5)
where Y represents the present value of the bureaucrat’s monetary income and N the set of
non-monetary perquisites of his/her position like leisure time, expensive lunches, reputation
and so on. Moreover, Y and N are related to the public output and the fiscal residuum (or
maximum level of production inefficiency) as follows:
Y = α2Q
β2FRγ2 (6)
N = α3Q
β3FRγ3 . (7)
Equations (6) and (7) can be interpreted as the reward structure of the bureaucrat which is
established by the sponsor. The main difference between the reward structure of a manager
in a profit-seeking firm and a typical bureaucrat is, that γ2 is relatively high for the manager
and relatively low for the bureaucrat. In contrast to the manager, the bureaucrat is not able
to appropriate directly any of the fiscal residuum as personal income. On the other hand,
the bureaucrat is characterized by relatively high values of β2, β3 and γ3.
Substituting Y and N in (5) yields an expression of the utility function in terms of the public
output, Q, and the fiscal residuum, FR:
U = αQβFRγ, (8)
where
α = α1α
β1
2 α
γ1
3
β = β1β2 + γ1β3
γ = β1γ2 + γ1γ3.
Now, the available combinations of public output and technical inefficiency determine the
choice constraint of the bureaucrat.
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In a next step, we want to derive the demand function of the voter. As pointed out by
Niskanen (1975) the budget function (1) is the integral of the demand function facing the
bureaucrat over the whole range of output, or in other words the monetary reflection of
the voter’s preferences. Since Niskanen assumes a quadratic budget function the demand
function for public output has to be linear (in prices). To derive this demand function we
follow Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000) and assume that the utility of the voter is given
by:
UV = X − (Q− ρ)
2
2θ
, with ρ, θ > 0, (9)
where X is the amount of the private good, which has by assumption a price of unity, and
ρ and θ are some parameters. Furthermore the budget constraint of the voter is given by:
Y V = Y + τ¯ g = X + τ(g)PQ, (10)
where Y V denotes the voter’s total income, Y the voter’s private income, and P the produc-
tion price of the public output presented to the voter in the form of tax payments. Unlike
Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000) we assume that the sponsor (or local government)
receives - besides tax revenue from service recipients - lump-sum grants, g, from higher
levels of government or other local governments (due to limited autonomy in raising own
revenues) in order to finance parts of the public output. Furthermore, the tax share, τ ,
accruing to the voter is assumed to depend on the amount of grants received by the local
government. Specifically, we assume that the tax share the voter will take into account in
his/her consumption decision is a negative function of the amount of grants due to fiscal
illusion (∂τ
∂g
< 0), that is, the higher the grants received by the local government, the lower
the perceived tax price of the public output (by the voter). Therefore the function τ(g)
captures the voter’s degree of fiscal illusion. If the local government does not receive any
grants, τ(g) is equal to the real tax share τ¯ . If, on the other hand, the local government does
receive a positive amount of grants, then τ(g) falls until it reaches a lower bound τ depending
on the amount of grants received. Of course, if the voter is completely free of fiscal illusion,
τ(g) equals the real tax share, τ¯ . But for the rest of the paper we will assume that the voter
underlies at least a certain degree of fiscal illusion. As can be seen from equation (10), an
increase in g then has two effects on the budget constraint: on the one hand voter’s total
income, Y V , will increase since τ¯ g rises (usual income effect), but on the other hand there
will also be a reduction in the tax price of the public output due to fiscal illusion (price effect).
Given the utility function and the budget constraint of the (median) voter, we can easily
derive the demand function for the public output:
Q = ρ− θτ(g)P, with ρ, θ > 0, (11)
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which, because of the quasilinearity of the utility function (9) does not depend on the voter’s
wealth. Now, as can be seen from equation (11), an increase in the amount of grants leads
to an increase in the demand for public output (∂Q
∂g
> 0) since the perceived tax price for
the voter decreases due to fiscal illusion.3
In order to investigate the effects of an increase in grants on technical inefficiency, we first
have to derive the budget function, TB:
TB = P ∗Q = 1
τ(g)
(aQ− bQ2) = 1
τ(g)
TBN , (12)
where we have used the fact that the total budget is given by P times Q. To be in line with
the original Niskanen (1971) model, we replaced ρ
θ
by a, 1
θ
by b and (aQ − bQ2) by TBN ,
the budget function (1) where fiscal illusion is absent, that is TBN represents the “true”
monetary reflection of the sponsor’s preferences. Since τ(g) ranges between the real tax
share (τ¯) and a lower bound (τ), TB is either equal or bigger than the “true” budget, TBN .
Moreover, substituting the total budget, TB, and the minimum total costs from equation
(2), TC, in (4), yields an expression for the fiscal residuum:
FR = TB − TC =
(
a
τ(g)
− c
)
Q−
(
b
τ(g)
+ d
)
Q2. (13)
As a next step, we can replace (13) in the utility function of the bureaucrat (8):
U = αQβ
[(
a
τ(g)
− c
)
Q−
(
b
τ(g)
+ d
)
Q2
]γ
, (14)
which yields an expression of the utility function depending solely on public output. Finally,
maximizing (14) with respect to Q then leads to the level of output that maximizes the
utility of the bureaucrat:
Q∗ =
β + γ
β + 2γ
(
a
τ(g)
− c
)
(
b
τ(g)
+ d
) . (15)
If we differentiate Q∗ with respect to the amount of grants received by higher levels of
government, g, we can see that g is an increasing function in Q∗:
∂Q∗
∂g
= −
(
β + γ
β + 2γ
)(
ad+ bc
(b+ τ(g)d)2
)
∂τ
∂g
> 0. (16)
3For the sake of simplicity we assume that the (median) voter has quasi-linear preferences which means that
income effects do not matter. The results, however, do not change if we use an utility function, which
does not exclude income effects. The difference between an equivalent increase in voter’s private income,
then, would be that the latter only causes an income effect, while in our case higher grants additionally
lower the price of public output and therefore also produce a substitution (or price) effect.
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In other words, if fiscal illusion is present, the demand for public output will rise as long as
the amount of grants increase. This is due to the fact that the voter systematically under-
estimates the true tax price of public output (∂τ
∂g
< 0) and therefore substitutes private for
public good consumption.
To find out the desired effect of an increase in g on the fiscal residuum or technical inefficiency
we finally have to plug in the level of output that maximizes the utility of the bureaucrat,
Q∗ in the definition of the fiscal residuum (13) and differentiate this expression with respect
to g:
∂FR∗
∂g
= −∂τ
∂g
1
τ(g)2
(
aQ∗ − bQ∗2)+ ∂Q∗
∂g
(
1
τ(g)
(a− 2bQ∗)− (c+ 2dQ∗)
)
= −∂τ
∂g
1
τ(g)2
TBN∗ +
∂Q∗
∂g
(
∂TB∗
∂Q∗
− ∂TC
∗
∂Q∗
)
, (17)
where the asterisks denote the values that maximize the bureaucrat’s utility. The sign of the
partial derivative of technical inefficiency with respect to the amount of grants now depends
on the signs of the two summands in equation (17). First, if the budget is positive (that is,
if Q ranges between zero and a
b
) and if we assume the presence of fiscal illusion (∂τ
∂g
< 0) the
sign of the first summand is positive. Concerning the second summand, we have shown in
equation (16) that grants are an increasing function of Q∗, that is the first term of the second
summand is bigger than zero. If a marginal increase in Q∗ causes total budget to increase
more than total costs (∂TB
∗
∂Q∗ >
∂TC∗
∂Q∗ ), the second summand in equation (17) will be positive,
too. If, on the other hand, both effects are of equal size (∂TB
∗
∂Q∗ =
∂TC∗
∂Q∗ ), this term will be
zero. The last two statements simply say that the increase in the fiscal residuum (due to
the increase of grants) must lie within the budget constraint (3). Nevertheless, in both cases
the overall effect of a marginal change in grants on technical inefficiency would be positive,
which proves our intended point that there is a negative incentive effect of intergovernmental
grants on technical efficiency. We can summarize these findings by the following proposition:
Proposition: In the presence of fiscal illusion (∂τ
∂g
< 0), an increase in grants from higher
levels of government or other local governments leads to an increase in the technical inef-
ficiency of the recipient government, if: (i) the budget is positive (0 < Q < a
b
) and (ii) a
marginal increase in output causes the total budget to increase more or as much as total costs
(∂TB
∗
∂Q∗ ≥ ∂TC
∗
∂Q∗ ).
A graphical representation of the above mentioned mechanism is given in figure 1. The
upper panel of figure 1 shows the budget function, TB, and the minimum cost function for
producing the public output, TC, whereas the lower panel outlines the corresponding fiscal
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Figure 1: Effects of an increase in the amount of grants
TB
TC
FR
Q
Q
TC
TB`
TB
FR`
FR
IC`
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Q*Q*` Qmax
FR*`
FR*
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a
residuum, FR, as well as the bureaucrat’s utility maximizing combination of output and
technical inefficiency represented by the tangency point of his/her indifference curve, IC,
and the fiscal residuum (point a). Now, an increase in the amount of grants received by
the local government causes the voter to assume that there has been a reduction in his/her
tax price due to fiscal illusion. As a consequence, the voter demands a higher amount of
public output, and the local government (which wants to meet the wishes of the median
voter) approves a higher budget, which is shown in the upper panel by the upward shift of
the budget curve from TB to TB′. The higher budget, in turn, leads to an upward shift
of the fiscal residuum from FR to FR′ (lower panel of figure 1), and, finally to the new
tangency point a′ at which both output and technical inefficiency has risen. In other words,
the bureaucrat uses parts of the new budget for the increase in public output, but he/she
also diverts parts for his/her own ends.
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3 Empirical Analysis
The proposition derived above provides a testable relationship between the amount of grants
received by the municipalities and the degree of technical inefficiency (or X-inefficiency). In
the German case this is of particular interest since grants received from higher levels of
government or other local governments constitute a considerable share of local government
revenues (as will be seen in the following subsection).
However, before presenting the results along with the underlying estimation approach and
data set, the institutional setting of the German local governments as well as the main
features of the German municipal system of fiscal equalisation (“Kommunaler Finanzaus-
gleich”) will be provided. This is necessary in order to clarify the context of local public
decision-making in Germany.
3.1 Institutional background
Germany’s fiscal constitution is characterised by a differentiated federal structure, where
municipalities constitute the lowest level of government. Nevertheless, local governments
exhibit considerable autonomy with regard to their revenue as well as expenditure side.
With respect to revenues, local governments have three main income sources: Tax rev-
enue (41% of total revenue in 2004), allocation of funds (31% of total revenue in 2004)
and revenue from user charges (9% of total revenue in 2004). In the German state Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg local governments can decide independently on five different types of taxes:
Trade tax (“Gewerbesteuer”), property tax (“Grundsteuer”) and three bagatelle taxes which
are not raised by all municipalities. Besides these own tax revenues, communities also re-
ceive tax revenue from higher levels of government. On the one hand, they get a share of
the revenue accruing from the federal income tax (15% of revenue raised in the state Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg) and interest income tax (12% raised in the state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg), on
the other hand, they also obtain 2.2% of the value added tax revenue raised in Germany as
a whole.
With respect to the allocation of funds, the German municipal system of fiscal equalisation
incorporates both vertical and horizontal elements, whereas all transfers within this equalisa-
tion system are regulated by law (“Finanzausgleichsgesetz - FAG”). The vertical equalisation
is concerned with the financial relationships between the state (of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg) and
its municipalities. The state has to ensure that the communities are able to perform their
tasks. In contrast, the horizontal equalisation serves to balance differences in the financial
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Table 1: Intergovernmental grants of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg’s municipalities in 2004
Type of grant Tsd e Per capita
Key grants 1761664 47143
Grants for current expenditures 1072881 29204
Grants for investments and investment assistance 354974 13953
Grants for municipalities with special financial requirements 5.509 0.540
Other general grants 180081 1672
Sum 3369606 91973
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, own calculations
power among the municipalities. This is necessary since (own) tax revenues of the commu-
nities can vary substantially among each other.4
The most important element of the fiscal equalisation system, however, constitutes the so
called fiscal equalisation mass (“Finanzausgleichsmasse”) which is financed by both the state
and the municipalities. Within a formula based system this fiscal equalisation mass is dis-
tributed to the local governments whereas jurisdictions with lower fiscal capacity receive
more grants from the fiscal equalisation mass. The different types of grants received by the
local governments of the state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg in the fiscal year 2004 are shown in Table
1. As can be seen from this table, roughly 50% of the fiscal equalisation mass are distributed
via so-called key grants (“Schlu¨sselzuweisungen”), which are lump-sum transfers established
according to a predetermined formula (‘key’).
As mentioned above tax revenues of the local governments strongly depend on municipal-
ities’ fiscal capacity. Therefore one fundamental idea of the key grants is to equate these
differences by comparing fiscal capacity with fiscal needs.5 On the basis of this comparison,
the system of fiscal equalisation distinguishes three types of municipalities: Firstly, if fiscal
capacity exceeds fiscal needs, the jurisdiction is said to be ‘abundant’ and obtains no (key)
grants. In case fiscal capacity lies between 60% and 100% of fiscal needs, the municipality is
called ‘financially weak’, and, finally, municipalities with a fiscal capacity of less than 60% of
fiscal needs are said to be ‘financially very weak’. Of course the (key) grants are highest for
the last category. The distribution of the municipalities’ financial power in 2004 is depicted
4For more details see Ministry of Finance of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (2006).
5Fiscal capacity (“Finanzkraft”) is calculated out of the municipalities’ sum of the different tax revenues
and the key grants received two years ago, whereas fiscal needs (“Finanzbedarf”) are established by
the product of a predetermined per capita sum (“Kopfbetrag”) and the number of inhabitants (of each
community).
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Table 2: Baden-Wu¨rttemberg’s municipalities according to their financial power in 2004
Type of municipality Number % of all municipalities
Abundant 104 9.36
Financially weak 737 66.34
Financially very weak 270 24.30
Total 1111
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, own calculations
in table 2. There it is shown, that most municipalities fall under the category ‘financially
weak’ whereas only a small fraction of the communities is ‘abundant’.
Turning to the expenditure side, the revenue obtained by local governments basically serves
to finance three types of tasks: (1) Voluntary tasks (e.g. museum), (2) duties without
instructions of higher-level governments (e.g. cleaning of public avenues), and (3) duties with
instructions of higher level-governments (e.g. running of local police authorities).6 Table 3
gives an detailed overview of the amount of money spent for the different types of tasks the
local governments face as well as the corresponding share of total expenditures for the year
2004 - using the classification of functions as given in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg’s administrative
regulation on the municipalities’ budgets (“Verwaltungsvorschrift u¨ber die Gliederung und
Gruppierung der Haushalte der Gemeinden”). As can be seen from the table, expenditures
on general financial management like interest and amortization repayments account for the
bulk of total expenditures (approximately one third). A major part of the budget is also
spent on social security (like kindergartens and youth welfare services) as well as public
facilities and business development (roughly 11%, respectively). Other posts on the budget
are generally somewhat smaller, whereas public safety constitutes the smallest part of the
budget (approximately 3% of total expenditures).
3.2 Estimation approach
To measure the (relative) efficiency of the local governments it is first necessary to select
an adequate set of input and output combinations that helps to identify the most efficient
local government(s) in the sample. In other words, we have to determine a so called ‘best
practice frontier’. In a second step, the (relative) efficiency of the other, less efficient munici-
palities can then be determined by measuring the deviations from this best practice frontier.
Basically there are two methods of measuring decision-making units’ technical efficiency in
6For more details see Gern (2005).
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Table 3: Apportionment of the total expenditures according to the administrative regulation
on the classification of the municipalities in 2004
Classification
Scope of functions
Expenditure Share of total
number (in e per capita) expenditure (in %)
0 General Administration 191.85 7.85
1 Public Safety 75.99 3.11
2 Schools 161.90 6.61
3 Science, Research, Culture 89.66 3.67
4 Social Security 280.76 11.49
5 Health, Sport, Recovery 127.28 5.20
6 Architecture, Housing, Traffic 241.45 9.89
7 Public Facilities, Business Development 277.95 11.36
8
Commercial Companies, General Basic
153.48 6.28
and Separate Assets
9 General Financial Management 844.14 34.55
Sum 2442.59 100
Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, own calculations
the literature (for an introduction see e.g. Lovell, 1993; Blank, 2000): Non-parametric and
parametric approaches. In non-parametric approaches such as Data Envelopment Analysis
(DEA; Farrell, 1957; Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes, 1978) or Free Disposable Hull (FDH;
Deprins, Simar and Tulkens, 1984), the best practice frontier envelopes the data as tightly
as possible, whereas this envelopment is achieved by solving a sequence of linear programs,
one for each decision-making unit. Parametric approaches, on the other hand, establish the
best practice frontier on the basis of a specific functional form using econometric estimation
methods. Moreover, the deviations from the best practice frontier derived from parametric
methods can be interpreted in two different ways. Firstly, deterministic approaches inter-
pret the whole deviation from the best practice frontier as inefficiency. In contrast to these
approaches, stochastic frontier models (Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt, 1977; Battese and Cora,
1977; Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977) decompose the deviation of the best practice
frontier in an inefficiency part, on the one hand, and in a part arising from other stochastic
influences or measurement errors, on the other hand. Since stochastic frontier models are
more precise in the definition of the deviation from the best practice frontier the present anal-
ysis uses this approach for determining the technical efficiency of German local governments.
Furthermore, as pointed out by Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the analysis of technical or
productive efficiency consists of two components: The first is the estimation of a (stochastic)
best practice frontier whereas the second component concerns the incorporation of exogenous
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or non-discretionary variables which may influence the performance of the decision making
units (local governments). More precisely, we can distinguish two kinds of such external
influences: ‘production preconditions’ and (real) determinants of technical efficiency. The
former can be interpreted as characteristics of municipalities that might affect both its in-
dividual production possibilities and its level of efficiency. Examples for such ‘production
preconditions’ are the socio-economic make-up of the population or structural factors like
the level of the unemployment rate or the population density. The determinants of efficiency,
like for example, the political colour of the local government, in contrast influence only the
level of technical efficiency but not its best practice frontier. The grants received by the local
government, of course, fall into the second category.
Exogenous variables have been incorporated into efficiency analyses in a variety of ways (for
an overview see Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In a two-step approach (e.g. Pitt and Lee,
1981; Berger and Mester, 1997; Worthington, 1999) the (in)efficiency scores are first deter-
mined by estimating a (stochastic) frontier and then these (in)efficiency scores are regressed
(e.g. with a Tobit censored regression model) on the exogenous variables. However, as
pointed out by Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGuckin (1991) and Reifenschneider and Stevenson
(1991) there are serious econometric problems with this approach. First, it must be assumed
that the (in)efficiencies scores obtained in the first stage are independently and identically
distributed, but if this is the case, the assumption that the (in)efficiency scores exhibit a
functional relationship with the exogenous variables in the second stage is contradicted. Sec-
ond, it must further be assumed that the output (or input) variables used for estimating
the best practice frontier in the first stage are uncorrelated with the exogenous variables. In
case they are correlated, the adequate maximum likelihood estimators are biased. If a large
set of output (or input) as well as exogenous variables is used this assumption is very likely
to be violated.
To avoid (at least one of) theses inconsistencies Kumbhakar et al. (1991), Reifenschneider
and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and Liu (1994) developed models for the technical inef-
ficiency effects involved in stochastic frontier functions. In such one-step approaches the
parameters of the stochastic frontier as well as the parameters of the exogenous variables
are estimated simultaneously. The model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995) which will
be used here extended these approaches to accommodate panel data. Employing a translog-
arithmic specification (Christensen, Jorgenson and Lawrence, 1973) the basic estimation
equation used in the present analysis to identify (among other things) the impact of grants
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on German municipalities’ technical or cost efficiency7 is:
lnCi,t = β0 +
S∑
r=1
βrlnyr,i,t +
1
2
S∑
r=1
S∑
q=1
βr,qlnyr,i,tlnyq,i,t + ψt + vi,t + ui,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
=εi,t
(18)
ui,t = δ0 +
J∑
j=1
δjzj,i,t + ψt + wi,t, (19)
where i is the subscript for decision-making units and t the time subscript. S and J desig-
nates the number of output and exogenous variables included in the model, respectively. Fur-
thermore, the dependent variable of equation (18), C, denotes the input indicator, whereas
y represents the various output indicators. The composed error term of equation (18), ε,
consists of a symmetric component, v, which is usually assumed to be independently and
identically normally distributed N(0, σ2v), and a one-sided non-negative component, u ≥ 0,
representing inefficiency. Both error terms are assumed to be independent. Moreover, the u’s
are assumed to be independently distributed, such that u is obtained by truncation (at zero)
of the normal distribution N(
∑J
j=1 δjzj,i,t, σ
2
u). z represents the various exogenous variables
and w a random variable, which is defined by the truncation of the normal distribution with
zero mean and variance σ2w (see Batesse and Coelli, 1995). The latter assumption ensures
that the inefficiency component, u, can only take on values bigger than or equal to zero. Fi-
nally, the time trends ψt are included to control for both technical change (in the stochastic
frontier) and time-varying inefficiency effects (see also Battese and Coelli, 1995; Audibert,
1997).
3.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on an annual database of 1111 municipalities in the German
state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg for the period of 1990 to 2004. For the estimation, however,
we restrict our attention to municipalities with more than 10000 inhabitants to get a more
homogeneous setting with regard to the different types of tasks performed by the munici-
palities. Especially the provision of public goods which are carried out on a voluntary basis
(e.g. libraries, public swimming pools, etc.) is more common in larger municipalities. The
7Here, the terms ‘technical’ and ‘cost’ efficiency are used synonymously. In fact, the usage of the right
term depends on the interpretation of equation (18). If, on the one hand, equation (18) is regarded
as a cost function (with input prices being equal to all municipalities) the term cost efficiency would
be appropriate. But if, on the other hand, the left hand side of equation (18) is interpreted as an
aggregate input indicator (of the municipalties), the term technical efficiency would be more suitable.
The difference between the two concepts is, that the cost efficiency contains besides the ‘technical’
component additionally an ‘allocative’ component.
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descriptive statistics of the input variable as well as the various output and exogenous vari-
ables for the reduced sample are provided in table 4.
Similar to Geys, Heinemann and Kalb (2007) the input for providing the public services is
approximated by total current (net) primary expenditures of the single local governments.
These include all spending on the current budget less the difference between debt service
and income from interest. Spending on the capital budget is not considered since large in-
vestments (e.g. in infrastructure projects) are infrequent events which inflate total spending
in the year they emerge. The empirical analysis uses net primary expenditures per capita as
dependent variables. As can be seen from table 4, both absolute and per capita expenditures
show substantial variation within the state (of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg).
Furthermore, the output of the local governments is approximated by five variables: (1) the
number of students in public schools (“Grund- und Hauptschulen”), (2) the total population,
(3) the share of population older than 65, (4) the number of employees covered by social
security (at place of work), and (5) the surface of public recovery areas. All these variables
represent approximations of important responsibilities of the municipalities with regard to
educational, infrastructural, social, economic and recreational services (see also De Borger
and Kerstens, 1996; Geys, 2006). Table 4 shows that the variation of the output indicators
is very high among the communities indicating that there are substantial differences with
regard to the (population) size of the municipalities.
As exogenous fiscal variables grants per capita were included in the model. According to the
proposition derived in section 2.2, it is expected that there is a positive relationship between
the amount of grants received by a local government and its technical inefficiency. In this
context the question arises whether there could be a problem of endogeneity when trying
to identify the effects of grants received by the local governments on cost efficiency. With
regard to this question it can be argued that the amount of grants received by the munici-
palities mainly depend on the fiscal capacity, that is on the sum of the different tax revenues
of the local governments. Hence, there is no direct relationship between (cost) efficiency
and the amount of grants received, since higher inefficiencies primarily lead to increases in
expenditures.
Moreover, to control for the fiscal capacity of a community which serves as a basis in the
municipal fiscal equalisation system (see section 3.1) dummy variables for ‘abundant’ and
‘financially weak’ municipalities were created and incorporated into the estimation equation
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Table 4: : Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Input variable:
Net current primary expenditures (in mio. e ) 55.90 142.08 9.01 2889.07
Net current primary expenditures (in e per capita) 1660.09 486.79 956.38 9644.19
Output variables:
Students in public schools 1691.08 2293.22 417 27625
Total population 28483.86 49050.06 8203 598470
Share of population older than 65 15.618 2.394 8.611 27.800
Social insured employees (at place of work) 12338.65 28713.05 663 385197
Recovery area (in are) 6115.54 10242.25 376 110841
Fiscal control variables:
Grants (in e per capita) 354.59 132.71 33.48 1898.35
Abundant municipalities 0.084 0.277 0 1
Financially weak municipalities 0.712 0.453 0 1
Financially very weak municipalities 0.204 0.403 0 1
Other control variables:
Unemployment rate (in %) 6.216 1.807 1.775 13.3
Population density (inhabitants per hectare) 5.718 4.563 0.682 28.86
Students at university 870.40 4160.85 0 35152
Accommodation facilities 12.883 18.028 0 155
Herfindahl index 0.339 0.069 0.211 1
Share of left 29.318 10.478 0 55.556
Year 8 4.321 1 15
Sample size: 3675 observations; 245 municipalities over 15 years (1990-2004).
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(19). Since abundant municipalities exhibit the highest fiscal capacity (fiscal capacity >
fiscal needs), it is expected that these municipalities have - in comparison to the other two
types of municipalties - more money to spend and therefore can afford more or qualitatively
higher public goods and services.
In addition, as mentioned in section 3.2, it is very important to control for other charac-
teristics of the municipalities which might influence their individual production possibilities
as well as their level of inefficiency. First, population density is included because it approx-
imates the rural and urban divide among the different municipalities. Moreover, it can be
regarded as a proxy for the heterogeneity of property prices, which tend to differ substan-
tially between rural and urban communities. While a high population density points to
cost advantages due to regional concentration of services (see e.g. De Borger and Kerstens,
1996), higher property prices in urban areas may render production more costly. Therefore
the effect of the population density on the level of municipalities’ spending is ambiguous.
Second, as pointed out by Geys, Heinemann and Kalb (2007), the level of the local au-
thorities’ unemployment rate may also affect the costs of providing a given bundle of public
services in opposed directions. On the one hand, a higher unemployment rate implies higher
spending on unemployment and housing benefits (‘cost effect’) and, on the other hand, a
higher unemployment rate can also entail lower demand for high quality public services (and
therefore lower spending) since people living in communities with high unemployment rates
typically have less money to spend (‘preference effect’).
Third, it is hypothesised that municipalities which are more dependent on tourism (e.g. the
black forest, the region around Lake Constance) have to spend relatively more money on
public services since tourists typically have a greater demand for high-cost or high-quality
services like adventure pools, an excellent net of hiking trails and so on. Therefore the vari-
able ‘accommodation facilities’, which captures the municipalities’ number of guesthouses
(hotels, boarding houses, youth hostels, etc.) was added to the specification. Fourth, the
number of students enrolled at universities (of the university cities) were incorporated to the
estimation equation (19). Similar to municipalities which are more dependent on tourism, it
is hypothesised that university cities have to spend relatively more money for infrastructure
services like, for example, a bus line network, student hostels or administrative things being
associated with students.
Moreover, political control variables were included in the specification. The Herfindahl index
measures the political concentration or monopolization of the local council. It is calculated
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out of the important parties’ share of seats (from ‘right’ to ‘left’: CDU, FDP, SPD, GRU¨NE)
and the share of seats of the so called ‘free voter unions’.8 It is expected, that high politi-
cal concentration points to low political competition and thus should reduce efficiency (see
e.g. Besley, Persson and Sturm, 2005). As a measure of political preferences, the share of
seats of the left-wing parties (i.e. SPD and GRU¨NE) in the local council (share of left) was
incorporated to estimation equation (19). This variable measures the impact of ideology
on technical efficiency. The ideological effect, however, is not easy to determine a priori
(Geys, Heinemann and Kalb, 2008), since left-wing parties indeed are often assumed to have
preferences for a larger government size. However, a larger government size not necessarily
implies less efficient governments. Therefore the effect of the share of left-wing parties in the
local council on technical efficiency is ambiguous.
Finally, to control for time effects in the stochastic frontier as well as in the inefficiency
model a time trend (year) was included in equation (18) and (19).
3.4 Results
The results of the estimation are shown in table 5.9 As can be seen from this table we esti-
mated two types of cost functions, a translogarithmic cost function as introduced in section
3.2 and a simple Cobb-Douglas cost function to check for the robustness of the results.
First of all, note that the variance parameter γ is close to one in both specifications and
highly significant. This parameter (lying between 0 and 1) indicates how much of the vari-
ation in the composed error term is due to the inefficiency term, ui,t, in equation (18). A
value close to zero indicates that the vast majority of residual variation is due to the normal
disturbance error, vi,t, whereas a value close to one indicates that much of the variation is
explained by the inefficiency component, ui,t. Therefore, in our case, much of the variation
in the composed error term is due to the inefficiency term, ui,t. Moreover, we carried out
(generalised) likelihood ratio tests. Firstly, we tested the null hypothesis that all covariates
of the inefficiency model (19) are jointly equal to zero. This resulted in a test statistic
of about 1157 in the translogarithmic and 1318 in the Cobb-Douglas case indicating that
in both cases the null hypothesis can strongly be rejected. Secondly, a test of the Cobb-
Douglas (restricted model) against the translogarithmic (unrestricted model) cost function
yielded a test statistic of about 210 which means that we can reject the null hypothesis of
8Free voter unions are loose federations of persons not belonging to special parties. In Germany such
federations only exist on the local level.
9For space constraints only the coefficients of the inefficiency model (19) are shown. The coefficients of the
full model, however, are reported in table A1 of the Appendix.
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the restricted model at the one percent level. This indicates that the non-linearities cap-
tured by the translogarithmic cost function (quadratic and cross-product terms of the output
measures) are highly significant and that the translogarithmic function represents the cost
structure of the municipalities better than the Cobb-Douglas function. Nevertheless, as men-
tioned above, the Cobb-Douglas cost function can serve to check the robustness of the results.
The results in table 5 support the negative incentive effect of intergovernmental grants on
local authorities’ cost efficiency as stated in the proposition of section 2.2. The coefficient
of the variable ‘grants’ is in the translogarithmic as well as in the Cobb-Douglas case highly
significant and has the expected positive sign indicating that an increase in the amount of
grants received by the local government leads (through an increase of the expenditures) to
a rise in technical inefficiency. As can be seen from the table, however, the effect is with a
coefficient of 0.0014 both in the translogarithimic and in the Cobb-Douglas case very small.
Table 5 also shows, that the dummy variables for ‘abundant’ and ‘financially weak’ munic-
ipalities are both positive and highly statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis
of section 3.3 where we argued that ‘abundant’ or ‘financially weak’ municipalities have (in
relation to ‘financially very weak’ communities, respectively) more money to spend which,
in turn, enable these municipalities to afford more or qualitatively higher public goods and
services.
Concerning the other control variables a closer look at table 5 reveals that the unemploy-
ment rate has a negative sign with robust significance in both the translogarithmic and the
Cobb-Douglas case. Hence the ‘preference effect’ mentioned in section 3.3 seems to outweigh
the ‘cost effect’. Secondly, it can be seen that municipalities with a high population density
tend to be less inefficient. This indicates that densely populated communities have cost
advantages due to agglomeration economies. Moreover, the variable ‘students at university’
has, contrary to our prediction in section 3.3, a negative sign in the translogarithmic case.
In the Cobb-Douglas case, however, the sign is positive. Hence, the effect of this variable
on the best practice frontier is ambigious. Finally, the variable ‘accommodation facilities’
is in both cases positive and highly statistically significant. This is in accordance with our
statement in section 3.3 where we hypothesised that touristic regions have (relatively) higher
expenditures due to greater demand for high-cost or high-quality services.
The political variables included in the estimation equation also attain statistical significance.
As expected, the Herfindahl index, as an indicator for political concentration and monopoli-
sation, significantly reduces efficiency in both specifications, or in other words, low political
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Table 5: : Determinants of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg local governments’s cost efficiency
Variable Translog Cobb-Douglas
(1) (2)
Fiscal Variables
Grants 0.0014** 0.0014**
(9.5057) (7.4171)
Abundant municipality 2.6919** 2.8225**
(14.7291) (6.9300)
Financially weak municipality 0.8019** 0.8565**
(7.1502) (6.0858)
Production environment and political constraints
Unemployment Rate -0.0271** -0.0131*
(-5.3756) (-2.5538)
Population Density -0.0104** -0.0054*
(-2.9481) (-2.2538)
Students at university, log -0.0362** 0.0083*
(-3.5782) (2.2066)
Accommodation Facilities 0.0096** 0.0105**
(7.5573) (7.3697)
Herfindahl index 2.4637** 2.4308**
(11.0895) (8.0659)
Share of left 0.0135** 0.0136**
(10.2378) (5.8140)
Year2 0.0379** 0.0356**
(7.0673) (7.5478)
Sigma-squared (σˆ2) 0.1628** 0.1648**
(13.3290) (8.0811)
Gamma (γ) 0.9352** 0.9316**
(143.6191) (113.7242)
Log-likelihood 2279.94 2174.78
Adjusted Pseudo-R2McF 0.2248 0.2559
Note: N = 3675. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures per capita. t-values are given in
parentheses. ** (*) denotes significance at 5% (10%) level. Coefficients of the output indicators (and their
quadratic and cross product terms) as well as the constant terms of the frontier and the inefficiency model
are not reported (see table A1 of the Appendix).
20
competition in the local governments seems to increase inefficiency. Moreover, local govern-
ments with a high share of left-wing parties seem to be involved with higher inefficiency.
Finally, the time trend included in the inefficiency model (‘year2’) is positive and highly
significant, too. This indicates that cost inefficiencies in the provision of public goods and
services tended to increase throughout the 15-year period.
4 Conclusions
This paper investigates the causal effect of intergovernmental grants on local jurisdictions’
cost efficiency or X-efficiency. For this purpose we use the simple bureaucracy model of
Niskanen (1975) and introduce the possibility that the federal government is able to give
grants to the local jurisdictions in order to substitute for (missing) local tax revenues due to
limited autonomy in raising own revenues. Similar to Moesen and van Cauwenberge (2000)
we assume that the voter underlies a kind of illusion with respect to the true tax price of
the public goods and services provided by the local government. In fact, we assume that
the existence of intergovernmental grants causes the voter to underestimate the true tax
price of the public goods due to fiscal illusion. Using this theoretical framework we show
that a higher degree of redistribution or an increase in the amount of grants received by the
local government leads to an increase in technical inefficiency in that local jurisdiction. Our
empirical analysis support the existence of such an (positive) incentive effect of fiscal equal-
isation on local jurisdictions’ cost inefficiency. In the line with the findings of Silkman and
Young (1982) and De Borger and Kerstens (1996) we show (using a broad panel of German
municipalities) that an increase in the amount of grants received by the local governments
indeed results in an increase in the cost (or technical) inefficiency in that local jurisdiction.
With regard to efficiency considerations, one implication of the above derived result is, that,
in order to reduce the degree of inefficiency (or to eliminate the fiscal illusion), the federal
government should give the local jurisdictions more autonomy in raising their own revenue
since, in this case, the fiscal illusion stemming from the intergovernmental grants would
diminish. In this context it would be interesting to analyse whether non-matching grants
stimulate technical inefficiency or X-inefficiency more than matching grants, since then the
fiscal equalisation scheme could be organised in such a way that technical inefficiency will
be minimized. But this is left for further research.
Finally, it should be noted that the empirical results have been derived by using a very
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limited and ‘rough’ set of indicators representing the whole outputs (and inputs) of a mu-
nicipality. Here, of course, a more detailed reproduction of the tasks accomplished by the
municipalities would be desirable. Unfortunately, this has not been possible so far due to
missing data (availability). Nevertheless, a further step could be to investigate the effect
of intergovernmental grants on technical inefficiency for a particular area of public goods
provision. (e.g. waste collection, public libraries and so on), since in that case the definition
of outputs is much easier and more obvious.
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Appendix
Table A1: Complete results of the multi-output frontier estimation
Variable Translog Cobb-Douglas
(1) (2)
Stochastic frontier
Constant (β0) 8.3308** 6.3365**
(7.6637) (92.8964)
A: Students in public schools 0.6218 -0.1042**
(1.5662) (-6.9166)
B: Total Population -0.7061 0.0286*
(-1.4636) (1.8029)
C: Share of population older than 65 0.2981 -0.0152
(0.6275) (-0.8436)
D: Social insured employees -0.4393* 0.1500**
(-2.2049) (21.6474)
E: Recovery Area 0.3238** 0.0047
(2.6256) (1.0680)
A2 0.0801 -
(1.2610)
B2 0.0044 -
(0.0592)
C2 -0.1026 -
(-1.3724)
D2 0.0477** -
(3.8634)
E2 0.0254** -
(4.6239)
A*B 0.0096 -
(0.0797)
A*C -0.2153* -
(-2.0287)
A*D -0.0563 -
(-1.3021)
A*E -0.1048** -
(-3.4756)
B*C 0.1958* -
(1.8423)
B*D -0.0112 -
(-0.2224)
B*E 0.0091 -
(0.2899)
C*D 0.0625 -
(1.4124)
C*E -0.0829** -
(-2.7055)
D*E 0.0154
(1.3177)
Year1 0.0141** 0.0135**
(21.2349) (24.4005)
Inefficiency model
Constant (δ0) -4.4927** -4.6840**
(-15.7318) (-6.6462)
Grants 0.0014** 0.0014**
(9.5057) (7.4171)
Abundant municipality 2.6919** 2.8225**
(14.7291) (6.9300)
Financially weak municipality 0.8019** 0.8563**
(7.1502) (6.0858)
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Table A1 (continued): Complete results of the multi-output frontier estimation
Unemployment Rate -0.0271** -0.0131*
(-5.3756) (-2.5538)
Population Density -0.0104** -0.0054*
(-2.9481) (-2.2538)
Students at university -0.0362** 0.0083*
(-3.5782) (2.2066)
Accommodation Facilities 0.0096** 0.0105**
(7.5573) (7.3697)
Herfindahl index 2.4637** 2.4308**
(11.0895) (8.0659)
Share of left 0.0135** 0.0136**
(10.2378) (5.8140)
Year2 0.0379** 0.0356**
(7.0673) (7.5478)
Sigma-squared (σˆ2) 0.1628** 0.1648**
(13.3290) (8.0811)
Gamma (γ) 0.9352** 0.9316**
(143.6191) (113.7242)
Log-likelihood 2279.94 2174.78
Adjusted Pseudo-R2McF 0.2248 0.2559
Note: N = 3675. Dependent variable: net current primary expenditures per capita. The dependent and output variables as well
as the variable students at university are in natural logs. t-values are given in parentheses. ** (*) denotes significance at 5%
(10%) level. The variables “year1” and “year2” account for both technical change in the stochastic frontier and time-varying
inefficiency effects. The results were obtained by using FRONTIER 4.1 (Coelli, 1996).
28
